Theorizing Anxiety and its Relation to Fear (of Crime): An Heideggerian Inspired Polemic

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ABSTRACT

While there is a voluminous literature on the fear of crime, it is marred by significant gaps. Particularly, while anxiety has been acknowledged as important to understanding fear (of crime), the failure to explicate and adequately theorize anxiety has impoverished intellectual inquiry. This article addresses this issue by theorizing anxiety in great detail. To this end, Martin Heidegger’s insightful analysis of fear and anxiety is introduced and discussed. The article draws on the paradoxes of anxiety “developed” by Heidegger to address the purported risk-fear paradox that has dominated fear of crime research and explicates why this paradox is more apparent than real.

Keywords: fear (of crime); anxiety; Martin Heidegger; Dasein; being; nothing(ess); knowledge production; paradoxes

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I. INTRODUCTION

Murray Lee writes that “[t]he term fear of crime is a recent invention” in that it “did not have linguistic currency prior to 1965.”¹ This “newness” aside, the concept is immensely popular in the social sciences, especially in criminology, evidenced in the voluminous literature explicating a plethora of issues related to crime, as well as safety and security more broadly.² One fruitful endeavour in fear of crime research has probed why it is that despite declining crime rates across North America beginning in the 1990s,³ fear about crime and other safety related issues continued to remain consistent or even rise.⁴ One explanation focused on fear about disorder in the mould articulated in the “broken windows” theory.⁵ More recently, attention has broadened – ranging from concerns over the Internet to violence in domestic spaces – to make sense of fear of crime.⁶ As a whole, fear of crime has been a useful research endeavour that has shed important light on the meaning of fear including its causal or contributory factors and what ought to or can be done about it, especially concerning its reduction.

² Ibid at 2. There were approximately 240,000 entries on the subject about a decade ago, which was exponentially larger than two decades ago, with only about 200.
⁵ James Q Wilson & George L Kelling, “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety” (1982) 249:1 Atlantic Monthly 29; Prashan Ranasinghe, "Public Disorder and its Relation to the Community-Civility-Consumption Triad: A Case Study on the Uses and Users of Contemporary Urban Public Space" (2011) 48:9 Urban Studies 1925; Prashan Ranasinghe, "Jane Jacobs’ Framing of Public Disorder and its Relation to the ‘Broken Windows’ Theory" (2012) 16:1 Theoretical Criminology 63. In the wake of “broken windows,” two forms of disorder, namely, social and physical, have been brought to light. Social disorder refers to disorderly behaviour, for example, panhandling, squeegeeing or loitering, among a whole host of others, while physical disorder refers to disorder of the material sort, for example, graffiti, unkempt lawns and gardens or dilapidated or abandoned buildings (see Wesley G Skogan, Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods (New York: The Free Press, 1990) at 4).
These explications of fear of crime have acknowledged the import of anxiety: it is now presupposed that the two are “close cognate[s]” as Wendy Hollway and Tony Jefferson state, ⁷ and there exists a voluminous literature that acknowledges the import of anxiety to explicating fear of crime.⁵ Yet, as much as anxiety is heralded as important to making sense of fear (of crime), ⁹ there are three significant, and related, concerns that require attention. First, there is a troubling tendency to treat anxiety as if it is clear and settled as to what is precisely meant by the term, especially its relation to fear of crime. It is possible to read myriad articles touting the import of anxiety, especially its connection to fear of crime, but which do not engage in even the slightest effort – or, have even the slightest desire – to articulate, even define, what is meant by anxiety. ¹⁰ Secondly, fear and anxiety appear to be conflated and confounded so that it is unclear which is being discussed

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⁹ What follows uses both the phrases “fear (of crime)” and “fear of crime.” The former is intended to speak to the dual nature of the relationship, that is, that some factor, for example, anxiety, is related both to fear on its own accord as well as fear of crime. The latter is straightforward and refers strictly to fear of crime.
and whether – and, if so how – each is related to the other. 11 Perhaps these issues are what lead Lee to note that “the term fear of crime is so loaded with meaning.” 12 Interestingly, even his own work is not immune from these very problems. In his comprehensive discussion of the concept of the fear of crime – including its genealogy – Lee does well to articulate the pressing issues surrounding it. Yet, and while he appears to differentiate fear of crime and anxiety in several places, 13 there are far too many instances when the two look very much the same so that it is difficult to decipher whether they are different, one and the same or related and if so, how. 14 Equally problematic is Lee’s failure to theorize anxiety – indeed, it is not defined even once in his work, another apt example of the rather taken-for-granted nature of the term. Finally, and equally important, anxiety tends to be undertheorized, a claim originally made about two decades ago. 15 This means that it is difficult, if not impossible, to fully make sense of anxiety and its place to fear (of crime). In fact, it is fair to claim that Holloway and Jefferson themselves appear to underplay how grave the problem is, because, in reality, the issue is not under theorization but the virtual absence of theorization. Thus, even where the term is defined or its various iterations noted (e.g., state versus trait anxiety; annihilation anxiety, social anxiety),


12 Lee, supra note 1 at 124.

13 See ibid at 47, 68.


15 Hollway & Jefferson, supra note 7 at 256.
there is little to no attempt to theoretically engage the concept and enrich the discussion.\textsuperscript{16}

It is important to note that there are a few exceptions to the foregoing, many of which have sought to explicate the way anxiety constitutes everyday subjectivities. Jefferson and Hollway,\textsuperscript{17} for example, articulate how notions of risk, security and uncertainty shape anxiety, while Robin Robinson and David Gadd\textsuperscript{18} discuss how what is referred to as “annihilation anxiety” can have almost paralytic effects and the way these are tied to class, race and gender. Similarly, the work of Alexandra Fanghanel and Jefferson\textsuperscript{19} analyse how anxiety and fear are locked into a reciprocal relation with racialized subjectivities, among others.\textsuperscript{20} This article draws inspiration from these interesting and insightful engagements with anxiety, but also claims that there is still a significant messiness – a conflation and confounding, in fact – between anxiety and fear (of crime) that needs addressing, first by way of a decoupling and next, and only then, a reconstitution. A good example of this problem is the often-noted risk-fear paradox\textsuperscript{21}: the least likely groups to be victimized (e.g. the elderly) are the most fearful while the most likely groups to be victimized (e.g. teenagers) are the least fearful. This paradox – that speaks of an “irrational” assessment of crime and victimization – is constituted as such because of a failure to properly account for the relation between anxiety and fear (of crime). Suffice it to say, then, that while

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\textsuperscript{17} Hollway & Jefferson, \textit{supra} note 7.


\textsuperscript{19} Fanghanel, \textit{supra} note 8; Jefferson, \textit{supra} note 8.

\textsuperscript{20} See also Sandra Walklate, "Excavating the Fear of Crime: Fear, Anxiety or Trust?" (1998) 2:4 Theoretical Criminology 403 at 404.

“research into fear of crime has indubitably become more sophisticated and reflective,” there still exist “tangible gaps.” This article serves as a modest attempt to attend to these through a deeper exploration, explication and theorization of anxiety and fear (of crime). So doing fills a crucial piece of the puzzle and provides valuable insights to conceptualize fear of crime and illuminates that the risk-fear paradox is more apparent than real, and what is labelled as irrational fear is far from that.

The article takes its cue from Martin Heidegger’s penetrating analysis of fear and anxiety, “kindred phenomen[a]” as he states. Several reasons influence the invocation of Heidegger. The first concerns the largely neglected stature of Heidegger’s work in studies in fear of crime of which criminology plays an important part. This article, it is hoped, will shed light on some promising and fruitful lines of inquiry that can emerge by invoking Heidegger, which could, in turn, provide a more diverse set of theoretical tools to explicate fear of crime, this especially in relation to circumventing the dogma that sometimes encapsulates the field, particularly with regards to its “scientific” – read positivistic – voracity. Secondly, Heidegger is, if not the only endeavour, then, certainly only a handful of endeavours that does not approach the conceptualization of anxiety from a presupposition. He, in other words, does not assume what anxiety is, but seeks to discursively unpack its constitution. Equally important, Heidegger also does not read anxiety as a pejoration of being, in contradistinction, for example, to Sigmund Freud whom, as will become apparent, Heidegger is

indebted to. In particular, this means that Heidegger does not view anxiety strictly in negative terms. Most pertinently in regards to what has been laid out above, Heidegger does not view anxiety strictly as an emotion (in contradistinction to many others, especially Freud). Rather, he views anxiety as an ontological state – what he calls a fundamental attunement\textsuperscript{28} – that sheds light on what it means to be (human), the being of being as he puts it. Thus, Matthew Ratcliffe writes that Heidegger “indicates that anxiety is never absent but is instead ‘covered up’, as though it were lying dormant”\textsuperscript{29} and Joseph Schear alludes to the dormancy of anxiety when he notes that for Heidegger anxiety is latent.\textsuperscript{30} In other words, while Heidegger’s conceptualization of anxiety permits a reading of it as an emotion in the traditional sense, there is much more to the way he frames it, and it is this latter aspect – as constitutive of being despite not being overwhelming or, at least overwhelming in the orthodox sense, what is referred to as “real” or “authentic” anxiety\textsuperscript{31} – that is deeply illuminating and capable of shedding important insights on its relation to fear (of crime). What is claimed, then, is that looking at anxiety as constitutive of being provides novel insights into fear (of crime). This endeavour, it is claimed, helps provide a more rich, 

\textsuperscript{26} Freud distinguished what he referred to as “realistic” anxiety from “neurotic” anxiety noting that the former “strikes us as something very rational and intelligible” thereby finding beneficial aspects about this form of anxiety, while reserving the problematics commonly associated with anxiety for the latter (Freud, “Anxiety”, supra note 25 at 441). There are some exceptions to this line of thinking in fear of crime research. Hollway and Jefferson (supra note 7), for example, appear to speak of the import of anxiety in their analysis. In terms of fear, Jackson and Gray (supra note 11) speak of its functionality, thereby suggesting that some level of fear need not be problematic (see also, Gray, Jackson & Farrall, supra note 11).

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\textsuperscript{31} Heidegger, supra note 23 at 234; Iain Thompson, "Death and Demise in Being and Time" in Mark A Wrathall, ed, The Cambridge companion to Heidegger’s Being and Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013) 260 at 261; Ratcliffe, supra note 29 at 171.
textured and layered analysis of fear of crime that can overcome the myriad problems raised by many of its ardent critics.\textsuperscript{32}

What follows is strictly a theoretical endeavour, a “think-piece” offered as a polemic to conventional social-scientific (especially criminological) inquiry, and in this spirit, is bereft of a case study. The next section undertakes a detailed exploration of Heidegger’s analysis of fear and anxiety. This is followed by a discussion of how it is possible to reimagine the connection between fear (of crime) and anxiety, in particular and counterintuitively, by drawing on a set of paradoxes to attend to the risk-fear paradox. The conclusion locates what the article has sought to endeavour with this approach.

II. FEAR, ANXIETY AND THE REVELATION OF BEING

A. Dasein

For Heidegger, anxiety (like fear, as will become apparent) is “a basic state of mind of Dasein.”\textsuperscript{33} To fully understand anxiety (and, its relation to fear), it is prudent to work through what Heidegger has in mind with this concept. The problem, however, is that Heidegger’s explication of Dasein is rather cryptic and riddled with ambiguities.\textsuperscript{34} The literal translation of


\textsuperscript{33} Heidegger, \textit{supra} note 23 at 179.

\textsuperscript{34} For example, Heidegger writes that “This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term ‘Dasein’”(Heidegger, \textit{supra} note 23 at 27 [emphasis in original]). His fuller and detailed explication only adds to the confusion:

Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather, it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive state of Dasein’s Being, and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being – a relationship which itself is one of Being. And this means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly. It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it. Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological (\textit{ibid} at 32 [emphasis omitted]).
Dasein is being-there, which Heidegger puts as such: “We name the being of man being-there, Da-sein.”35 Even this, however, is not without contention.36 Perhaps more importantly, what precisely being-there means is also not clear. Hubert Dreyfus suggests that being-there ought to be thought of as Heidegger’s interest “in the human way of being,”37 which provides important insights to deciphering Dasein, as does relying on Heideggerian scholars for guidance. In his introduction to a collection of Heidegger’s essays, David Krell comments that “Heidegger thinks of the being that raises questions. He names it Dasein, the kind of being that is open to Being.”38 An equally useful explanation is found in the translators’ introduction to Heidegger’s39 important Introduction to Metaphysics, where Gregory Fried and Richard Polt “think of Dasein...as a condition into which human beings enter, either individually or collectively, at a historical juncture when Being becomes an issue for them.”40 Given the foregoing, Dasein can be thought of as a way of being that has as its concern the meaning of existence: what it means to be, the being of beings as Heidegger puts it.41

35 Heidegger, supra note 28 at 63 [emphases omitted].
36 Where Heidegger hyphenates the Dasein, as in Da-sein, which he often does, as evinced in this quote, it is believed by some that a more appropriate translation should be being-here (see Gregory Fried & Richard Polt, "Translator’s Introduction" in Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, translated by Gregory Fried & Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000) vii at xii).
40 Fried & Polt, supra note 36 at xii.
41 There is an important distinction between being(s) (used interchangeably for human being(s), that is, designating a person or persons) and being (often penned as Being to differentiate it from being). The latter captures an ontological state or the constitution of humans, in other words, a metanarrative or theory of what makes humans, human, that is, and to draw upon Dreyfus, the way of being human (Dreyfus, supra note 37). The corpus of Heidegger’s work focuses on being in this ontological sense, that is, the being of beings. This article uses being rather than Being because, and to draw upon and follow Dreyfus’ cautionary note: “If one writes Being with a capital B in English, it suggests some entity; indeed, it suggests a supreme Being, the ultimate entity” and for
B. Dasein and Moods

One aspect of Dasein is that it is constituted by moods, two of which, namely, anxiety and fear, are important for present purposes. By mood Heidegger means a state of mind, that is, an “everyday sort of thing: our mood, our Being-attuned.” To put this differently, “A mood makes manifest ‘how one is, and how one is fairing’. In this ‘how one is’, having a mood brings Being to its ‘there’.” Given that Dasein concerns being and moods are part and parcel of Dasein in that they reveal “how one is,” means that there is an important relation between Dasein and mood, because, as Dreyfus puts it, “moods...manifest the tone of being-there.” Accordingly, Heidegger notes that “ontologically mood is a primordial kind of Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of disclosure.” This is why he immediately states that “we are never free of moods.” Moods, in other words, disclose Dasein and this disclosure is not only a priori to all knowledge, but also temporally before all knowledge, which is to say that it is in the being of beings, there, that is, from the very inception of being, hence the literal translation of being-there. This is why Heidegger writes that “A mood assails us. It comes neither from ‘outside’ nor from ‘inside’, but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being...The mood has already

Heidegger, "being is not an entity" (Dreyfus, supra note 37 at 11). Unfortunately, many translations utilize Being rather than being, as evinced in the translation relied here.


Heidegger, supra note 23 at 162.

Ibid at 173.

Dreyfus, supra note 37 at 169 [emphasis added].

Heidegger, supra note 23 at 175 [emphasis in original].

Ibid at 175 [emphases added].

Matthew Ratcliffe (supra note 29) states that moods constitute being in a fashion that is both pre-subjective and pre-objective, alluding to the a priority of knowledge. Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety is influenced by the work of Sigmund Freud. On anxiety being prior to all knowledge, Freud writes: “We believe that it is in the act of birth that there comes about the combination of unpleasurable feelings, impulses of discharge and bodily sensations which has become the prototype of the effects of a mortal danger and has ever since been repeated by us as the state of anxiety” (Freud, “Anxiety”, supra note 25 at 444 [emphases in original]).
disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct one-self towards something.”

Thus, a mood “implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us.” In other words, a mood discloses and reveals Dasein to beings, that is, the very constitution of what it means to be human.

C. The Without-Nature of Fear

Fear, like anxiety, is a mood that discloses Dasein. Heidegger claims there are three related points of view through which to consider fear: that in the face of which one fears, fearing and about what is feared. With respect to the first, Heidegger notes “That in the face of which we fear, the ‘fearsome’, is in every case something which we encounter within-the-world” and this fearing of what is fearsome “can be characterized as threatening.” Accordingly, fear is something that emanates from without, that is, from “within the world,” which means that it is not something that emanates from within the individual. This is important because it is from the without-nature of fear that the potentiality for its threatening character is found. The sequence by which something becomes threatening unfolds as follows. To say that something is threatening, Heidegger explains, is to claim that this something “has detrimentality as its kind of involvement,” that is, this something is detrimental to being. This detriment, Heidegger writes, “is itself made definite, and comes from a definite region,” but “is not yet within striking distance, but it is coming close.” The threatening character, in other words, emanates from being at a striking distance. Here, the without-nature of fear is illuminated for the step from which something moves from being innocuous to becoming a concern is situated in a specific

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49 Heidegger, supra note 23 at 176 [emphases omitted].
50 Ibid at 177 [emphases omitted].
51 Drawing upon Heidegger, Sarah Ahmed (“Not in the Mood” (2014) 84:1 New Formations 13) equates moods to an atmosphere, writing that “it is not that we catch a feeling from another person but that we are caught up in feelings that are not our own...[M]oods become almost like companions; what we carry with us is how we are carried.”
52 Heidegger, supra note 23 at 179.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid at 179-180.
object with a specific locus that originates from the outside. As the detriment – the something – draws closer, “We say, 'It is fearsome'.”

Thus, it is possible to see not only the processes by which an object gets turned into something to be feared, but also that, this is always something that emanates from without, never within, a significant point that helps distinguish fear from anxiety. Given the above, it is also possible to see that in the process of fearing – the second vantage point from which Heidegger examines fear – something needs to happen to turn the object into a concern about a threat, one that is detrimental to being. As Heidegger says, “In fearing as such, what we have thus characterized as threatening is freed and allowed to matter to us,” and the fact it matters is the moment when the threat is turned into something to fear. The step in coming to fear something, the fearing – the move from point one to two – is possible because Dasein is always concerned with its being and this concern constitutes Dasein: it is, to put it differently, something that is within Dasein and this within-nature means that Dasein is always on the lookout for things that are detrimental to its being. Thus, Heidegger writes that “Circumspection” – Dasein’s urge to be cautious about itself and everything surrounding it – “sees the fearsome because it has fear as its state of mind.”

This latter point leads to the final vantage point from which to makes sense of fear, that is, that about which one fears. This last point, essentially, the shift from one and two to three, is only possible because Dasein, as noted above, is itself fearful, that is, that it has fear as one of its moods: “That which fear fears about is that very entity which is afraid – Dasein. Only an entity for which in its Being this very Being is an issue, can be afraid. Fearing

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57 Ibid at 180. There are other variations, which are only mentioned in passing here because they are not germane to the discussion. Where there is a threatening situation but it is not proximally close enough, fear can become a source of alarm, but only so when what is threatening “is proximally something well known and familiar” (ibid at 181). In other instances, where what is threatening “has the character of something altogether unfamiliar, fear becomes dread” (ibid at 182 [emphasis in original]). Additionally, “where that which threatens is laden with dread, and is at the same time encountered with the suddenness of the alarming, fear becomes terror” (ibid [emphasis in original]).

58 Freud (“Anxiety” supra note 25 at 443) perhaps put it best: anxiety “relates to the state and disregards the object” while fear “draws attention precisely to the object.”

59 Heidegger, supra note 23 at 180 [emphases omitted].

60 Ibid.
discloses this entity as endangered and abandoned to itself."\(^{61}\) As Heidegger puts it pithily: "different possibilities of Being emerge in fearing."\(^{62}\)

For Heidegger, fear should not be simply looked at as a negative, but as something that has important positive aspects in relation to both the constitution of being and the very cognizance and understanding of being itself. This knowledge and understanding, however, does not come to full realization in fear, but is to be found in, and realized through, anxiety. That said, fear is that first step in Dasein recognizing its limits – its demise or mortality – and this has important implications for how beings come to terms with being:

Dasein is in every case concernful Being-alongside. Proximally and for the most part, Dasein is in terms of what it is concerned with. When this is endangered, Being alongside is threatened. Fear discloses Dasein predominantly in a privative way. It bewilders us and makes us ‘lose our heads’. Fear closes off our endangered Being-in, and yet at the same time lets us see it, so that when the fear subsided, Dasein must first find its way about again.\(^{63}\)

In other words, a being that is concerned with itself – Heidegger refers to this as care\(^{64}\) – is one who takes the necessary steps to eliminate or minimize these threats, essentially amounting to the care of the self.

As noted above, however, as much as fear discloses and reveals Dasein – as a being concerned with the care for, and of, its being – fear is unable to fully disclose the constitution of Dasein, which means that a being cannot properly care for its being. This is why Heidegger writes that fear “bewilders us and makes us ‘lose our heads,’”\(^{65}\) essentially highlighting that as much as fear discloses, it simultaneously occludes and conceals because of the very nature of fear itself, that is, its inability to be fully transparent. In expanding upon this, Jonathan McKenzie notes that for Heidegger, “[f]ear is inauthentic because it backs away from itself and it does not take hold of any definite possibility.”\(^{66}\) This is why fear is unable to fully disclose and reveal. If Heidegger’s reasoning is plausible, then – and, this will (likely) court controversy – this means that there will exist in the field of knowledge production a particular gap that empirical inquiry will not – because it cannot – shed light upon, a premise that is consonant and consistent with,
and constant in, Heidegger’s pessimistic outlook towards the sciences as a whole. This would also mean that social scientists interested in explicating fear – especially its cause and effect or, at least its contributory factors – will be, according to Heidegger, unable to shed much insights. In fact, even philosophical (in particular existential and phenomenological) inquiry will always be unable to shed complete light on issues. Dreyfus explicates Heidegger’s reasoning well when he notes that Ontology “is always unfinished and subject to error” because an “explication of our understanding of being can never be complete because we dwell in it.”

This would mean, according to Dreyfus, “the more important some aspect of our understanding of being is, the less we can get at it.” This contentious matter can be held in abeyance momentarily because, as noted above, the mood of fear does not fully bring this to light. That said, what fear does not disclose – the problem about fear itself – can be addressed via anxiety, which can shed additional light on this issue. Thus, by way of the oft noted risk-fear paradox, the mood of anxiety can be invoked to illustrate the shortcomings with fear, in particular, that what is thought of as a paradox, is, in fact, far from paradoxical.

D. The Revelatory Nature of the Paradoxes of Anxiety

Echoing Freud – who wrote that “there is no question that the problem of anxiety is a nodal point at which the most various and important questions converge, a riddle whose solution would be bound to throw a flood of light on our whole mental existence” – Heidegger claims that “As one of Dasein’s possibilities of Being, anxiety...provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping Dasein’s primordial totality of Being.” In other words, and as Dreyfus explains, Heidegger “needs to find a special method for revealing Dasein’s total structure” and, therefore, “[t]o reveal Dasein simple and whole Heidegger chooses anxiety.” For Heidegger, then, “the basic state-of-mind of anxiety [i]s a distinctive way in which Dasein is...

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68 Dreyfus, supra note 37 at 22.
69 Ibid.
70 Freud, “Anxiety”, supra note 25 at 441.
71 Heidegger, supra note 23 at 227 [emphases added].
72 Dreyfus, supra note 37 at 176,177.
disclosed, and this is because “in anxiety Dasein gets brought before itself through its own Being”74 There is, in other words, something authentic about anxiety, in contradistinction, for example, to fear. It requires underlining, then, that something profoundly different constitutes fear and anxiety, despite being, as noted above, “kindred phenomena.” Anxiety is closer to the constitution of being than fear – it is a priori in humanity, even before, as Freud claims, birth, that is, life itself – so that only through anxiety, not fear, can the essence of being be discovered and illuminated.

Recall that a particular problem in fear of crime research has been not only the failure to treat fear and anxiety as explicitly different phenomena, but also confound and conflate them. Heidegger, though writing in a much different time and context, underlines this very problem in the broader literature, stating that “for the most part they have not been distinguished from one another: that which is fear, gets designated as ‘anxiety’, while that which has the character of anxiety, gets called ‘fear’.”76 What follows focuses on a key distinction between the two, namely, the source of their emanations and then explicates anxiety as an important constitution – what Heidegger calls a fundamental attunement77 – of being.

A lengthy passage introduces the distinction Heidegger carves between the origins of fear and anxiety:

What is the difference phenomenally between that in the face of which anxiety is anxious and that in the face of which fear is afraid? That in the face of which one has anxiety is not an entity within-the-world. Thus it is essentially incapable of having an involvement. This threatening does not have the character of a definite detrimentality which reaches what is threatened, and which reaches it with definite regard... That in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite. Not only does this indefiniteness leave factically undecided which entity within-the-world is threatening us, but it also tells us that entities within-the-world are not ‘relevant’ at all...[T]he world has the character of completely lacking significance. In anxiety one does not encounter this thing or that thing which, as something threatening, must have involvement.78

The foregoing highlights several matters of import. First, and to repeat, fear originates from without, anxiety from within. Heidegger is unequivocal

73 Heidegger, supra note 23 at 228 [emphases added].
74 Ibid.
75 See McKenzie, supra note 42 at 575.
76 Heidegger, supra note 23 at 230.
77 Heidegger, supra note 28 at 29-77.
78 Heidegger, supra note 23 at 230-231 [emphases added].
on this. The implication of this premise is even more important: with anxiety, unlike fear, the issue is not about the way something gets turned into a threat because of its detrimental nature to being; rather, in anxiety, concern over being reigns supreme – certainly more than with fear – because the threat to being is already extant, extant even before life.\(^79\)

The most important premise from the foregoing passage, however, needs further elucidation in two steps. First, Heidegger is clear that what beings are anxious about is completely indefinite. Given this, two significant issues arise. First, if something is indefinite, it means that it is not definite, which means that it is, in many (or some) ways, intangible, and this would render it difficult (or even impossible) to clearly articulate (that is, to get a lucid sense of what the it is). Second, and related, to claim that definiteness is inexistent is to claim the absence of certainty, precision and the fixed-nature of something, this something being not only the source of anxiety, but anxiety itself. That is, the uncertainty, imprecision and most importantly for present purposes, lack of clarity means that there are no conditions or characteristics that can be extrapolated to meaningfully make sense of anxiety. To claim, then, that anxiety is indefinite – and, to underline, Heidegger states that this indefiniteness is complete or completely so – is to say that the source of anxiety and, most importantly, anxiety itself, are unclear, that is, they are not subject to clarity and clarification. Unlike fear – which has a clear and definite external source and can be pinpointed and located – anxiety has no such source or locus and what might look like such is itself murky and confounding. Thus, if Heidegger’s premises are followed to their rightful conclusion, it is not just the sources or origins of anxiety that are unclear, but anxiety itself. This is perhaps what leads Ratcliffe to note that “the referent of the term ‘anxiety’ starts to look a little unclear.”\(^80\)

The indefiniteness of anxiety leads to the second step alluded to above, and with it, the most significant conclusion to draw, namely, given the lack of clarity about anxiety, it is, unlike fear, not easily amenable to explication. Indeed, if the argument is followed logically through to the end, what must be concluded is not just that anxiety is not easily explicable but that it is (largely) inexplicable. Heidegger writes that “when something threatening

\(^79\) Freud, “Anxiety”, supra note 25 at 443; see also Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991) at 44.

\(^80\) Ratcliffe, supra note 29 at 172.
brings itself close, anxiety does not ‘see’ any definite ‘here’ or ‘yonder’ from which it comes. That in the face of which one has anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens is nowhere.”  

Here, the import of sight and site require attention. It is not just that in anxiety beings are unable to see the source of anxiety, but importantly, the inability to see is a product of the fact that there is nothing to see. This conclusion, certainly agonistic, is drawn from the fact that a locus of (and for) anxiety does not exist. Anxiety, unlike fear, cannot be properly sited. It can be claimed, for example, that anxiety emanates from the unconscious, that is, the within, as Freud states, a point that others embrace as well.  

Yet, this site is not simply vast, but also ambiguous. It exists, but in a paradoxical way, in that it exists – and certainly takes hold of beings – but is simultaneously nowhere. Crucially, then, if anxiety is nowhere and yet constitutes being, then it must be so while also not being and, as well, being nowhere while also concomitantly being somewhere (perhaps everywhere). Heidegger alludes to this: “Anxiety ‘does not know’ what that in the face of which it is anxious is...Therefore that which threatens cannot bring itself close from a definite direction within what is close by; it is already ‘there’, and yet nowhere; it is so close that it is oppressive and stifles one’s breath, and yet it is nowhere.” If this reasoning is plausible, then, the inexplicable nature of anxiety must also be acknowledged. Anxiety exists but its existence cannot be meaningfully made sense of. It consumes and swallows as a whole, but, again, an explanation for such cannot be provided. Anxiety is the (largely) inexplicable mood that constitutes being.

Another way to conceptualize the nowhere/somewhere paradox of anxiety is through what Heidegger refers to as the uncanny. “In anxiety,” Heidegger writes, “one feels ‘uncanny.’” By uncanny, Freud, who laid its framework, refers to “something which is secretly familiar, which has undergone repression and then returned from it” so that “the uncanny is the class of the frightening which leads us back to what is known of old and long familiar.” The uncanny, to put simply, is the familiarity with

81 Heidegger, supra note 23 at 231 [emphasis in original].
82 Freud, “Anxiety”, supra note 25 at 459.
83 E.g. Giddens, supra note 79 at 4445.
84 Heidegger, supra note 23 at 231.
85 Ibid at 233.
something frightening. Drawing on this, Heidegger expands the notion of the uncanny to speak of its intangible nature, which is also implicit in Freud’s formulation. With the uncanny, Heidegger says, “the peculiar indefiniteness of that which Dasein finds itself alongside in anxiety, comes proximally to expression: the ‘nothing and nowhere’. But here ‘uncanniness’ also means ‘not-being-at-home’.” One reason that anxiety leaves beings in an indefinite state constituted by the absence of clarity is because in this nowhere from which it emerges (itself a paradox), anxiety, which is something, is also nothing (yet another paradox). Thus, to the nowhere/somewhere paradox, it is necessary to also add the nothing/something paradox that constitutes anxiety.

How is it, then, that nothing comes to constitute anxiety and with it being? Heidegger writes that “[a]nxiety reveals the nothing.” This is because even though a feeling of unease exists or persists because of anxiety, it is difficult, if not impossible, to explicate why such a feeling envelops, permeates, consumes and swallows one. “We can” Heidegger says, “get no hold on things” and, thus, “[i]n the slipping away of beings only this ‘no hold on things’ comes over us and remains.” This means, Heidegger says, that “anxiety leaves us hanging,” and rather unsettled, that is, without firm footing or ground(ing) to know and understand being. “In this altogether unsettling experience,” he writes, “there is nothing to hold on to,” even

87 A more detailed explanation of the uncanny provided by Freud helps make sense of the homelessness of the term that Heidegger, as will become apparent, draws attention to: In the first place, if psychoanalytic theory is correct in maintaining that every affect belonging to an emotional impulse, whatever its kind, is transformed, if it is repressed, into anxiety, then among instances of frightening things there must be one class in which the frightening element can be shown to be something repressed which recurs. This class of frightening things would then constitute the uncanny; and it must be a matter of indifference whether what is uncanny was itself originally frightening or whether it carried some other affect. In the second place, if this is indeed the secret nature of the uncanny, we can understand why linguistic usage has extended das Heimliche ['homely'] [brackets in original] into its opposite, das Unheimliche; for this uncanny is in reality nothing new or alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has become alienated from it only through the process of repression (Freud, “The Uncanny”, supra note 25 at 217 [emphases in original]).

88 Heidegger, supra note 23 at 233 [emphasis added].
89 Heidegger, supra note 67 at 101.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
though one is still hanging or, at least has a profound sense or need to hang (onto something). In other words, and most crucially, one is hanging onto nothing. What remains is an emptiness, a sense of nothingness: “we must say that that in the face of which and for which we were anxious was ‘properly’ – nothing. Indeed: the nothing itself – as such was there.”93 The very attempt to explicate anxiety – itself something, yet nothing, itself somewhere but also nowhere – only leaves beings “bewildered” (just like fear does), because there is a constant grasping onto something that needs immediate and grave explication but one that is simply not amenable to it. Dreyfus explains this as follows:

Anxiety is thus the disclosure accompanying a Dasein’s preontological sense that it is not the source of the meanings it uses to understand itself; that the public world makes no intrinsic sense for it and would go on whether that particular Dasein existed or not. In anxiety Dasein discovers that it has no meaning or content of its own; nothing individualizes it but its empty thrownness.94

What has been penned thus far looks bleak especially considering the concealed nature of fear and that the risk-fear paradox was to be resolved by introducing anxiety, which, however, is constituted by its own paradoxes that have further muddied matters. This problem, however, is more apparent than real. What follows focuses on the redemptive aspect of anxiety, a redemption of (and about) being as being in its true self brought to the fore and illuminated brightly.

One aspect of the uncanniness of anxiety, noted above, is that it is concomitantly something and nothing and, as well, nowhere and somewhere. Another aspect of it, also noted above, is that uncanniness reveals something precise about being, that is, that being is, always, not at home, essentially homeless. Heidegger notes that “uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly,”95 and thus, “Being-in enters into the existential ‘mode’ of the ‘not-at-home,’”96 alluding to the inherent homelessness of the being of beings. Thus, it is not just the paradoxes of anxiety – something/nothing and nowhere/somewhere – that are (largely) inexplicable for the subject, but uncanniness as well. This, Heidegger puts as such: “the mood of

93 Ibid.
94 Dreyfus, supra note 37 at 180.
95 Heidegger, supra note 23 at 234.
96 Ibid at 233 [emphases in original].
uncanniness remains, factically, something for which we mostly have no existentiell understanding.”

Yet, what anxiety does that fear does not – because it cannot and this is because anxiety speaks to the inner, that is being itself, while fear speaks to an outside entity – is reveal the very shortcomings of being: essentially the paradoxes of life, but more precisely, that life lived as being is one that is without-home and nothing. Rather than read anxiety problematically as most do, Heidegger rescues anxiety from such a predicament and holds it up as the beacon of hope, a beacon that brightly shines light on the essence of being. Thus, while anxiety reveals the somewhere/nowhere and the something/nothing as a problem of being, it also reveals that this problem is, in fact, not a problem, but simply indicative of what it means to be:

*in anxiety there lies the possibility of a disclosure which is quite distinctive; for anxiety individualizes. This individualization brings Dasein back from its falling [the failure to see it in its truest sense], and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being. These basic possibilities of Dasein...show themselves in anxiety.*

This, then, is what Heidegger sees in anxiety: its revelatory potential (that fear does not possess). Fear speaks to and illuminates what happens to beings when an outside entity is thought to be relevant to it (regarding detrimentality to being). Anxiety speaks to the very core of being human – a fundamental attunement – one constituted by profound paradoxes that reveal deeply and unequivocally its limits: death. Similar to the way Heidegger sees the import of anxiety to understanding and making sense of the being of beings, the same can be said about understanding and making

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97 *Ibid* at 234.

98 *Ibid* at 235 [emphases added].

99 There is an important difference between what Heidegger means by death and what he refers to as demise (though there is a literature that tends to conflate the two). The latter speaks to the mortality of humans, in other words, what is ordinarily referred to as death. Yet, for Heidegger, the word death is the realization of the limits of Dasein, and in that sense, has nothing to do with demise, but rather a continuation of life fully aware of its limits. William Blattner uses the term “existential death” to differentiate this from demise (William Blattner, *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger’s Being and Time* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 342). In describing Heidegger’s use of the term death, Iain Thompson claims that Heidegger “calls death the possibility of an impossibility” because “My projects collapse, and I no longer have a concrete self I can be, but I still am this inability-to-be. Heidegger calls this paradoxical condition [yet another paradox] revealed by anticipation ‘the possibility of an impossibility’ or death’” (Thompson, *supra* note 31 at 269, 271 [emphases in original]).
sense of the paradox said to constitute the fear of crime. The final section explicates this.

**III. RETHINKING THE PARADOX OF THE FEAR OF CRIME: RETHINKING ANXIETY VIS-À-VIS FEAR**

A profound challenge that fear of crime research faces is the risk-fear paradox. This paradox, however, is a problem that the social sciences, in particular criminology, have created largely because of a preoccupation with measurement. As Sandra Walklate\(^{100}\) writes in a different, though related, context: “despite the inherent difficulties around what actually counts as violence, criminology, criminologists and others persist with engaging in the art of measuring it.” Similarly, Ronnie Lippens writes of the “spectacular manifestations of self-righteousness” even in so-called critical criminology.\(^{101}\)

In many ways, the same can be said of what is transpiring with fear of crime research. The risk-fear paradox is certainly interesting – even, intriguing – but it is not a paradox. What follows explicates this and how inquiries concerning fear of crime can be advanced.

Anxiety, it has been suggested by invoking Heidegger, is a largely inexplicable mood or state of mind. More importantly, this inexplicability, it is argued, is not a problem, but rather a statement about the limits of knowledge production, which fear of crime research must come to terms with. What is now presupposed is the close and important relation between fear and anxiety and, as well, that anxiety can shed important light on the fear of crime. Theoretically engaging anxiety allows the risk-fear paradox to be addressed head-on. This is so, it should underline, not despite the paradoxes of anxiety, but precisely because of, and thus through, them; in other words, the very paradoxes of anxiety extracted from Heidegger’s writings are not simply important but essential to tackling this issue, and in many ways what has hindered fear of crime research is a doggedness to acknowledge and work with these paradoxes (essentially coming to terms with the limits of knowledge production). Thus, when anxiety is brought

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into a meaningful conversation with fear of crime, what hitherto has not been explained about the latter can be reconceptualized anew and the answer, then, is said to lie not necessarily or simply in fear (or fear of crime) or crime rates or disorder or some other external factor, but in anxiety itself. The revelatory aspect of this conclusion is further magnified when the paradoxes of anxiety show that anxiety itself is inexplicable. Thus, if anxiety is largely inexplicable, then, this would also mean, if the premise is developed to its logical conclusion, that fear of crime – which it is presupposed needs anxiety to be meaningful – is also not fully explicable. This suggests, then, that fear of crime research must be willing to come to terms with the fact that it might be unable to fully explicate what it has constructed as a problem. In fact, it must be willing to acknowledge that what it has constructed as a problem is not – and, never was – a problem. The problem, essentially, is the stubbornness to seek to rectify something that cannot be rectified. This is what Heidegger’s probing inquiry, and engaging anxiety theoretically, illustrates.

Claiming that anxiety explains fear of crime is not novel, perhaps even interesting, but what is, is to claim that when anxiety is brought into the conversation, the need to delve further to resolve the risk-fear paradox disappears because what anxiety illuminates is that there are certain innate, inexplicable, states of mind that constitute the being of particular beings and these can range, for example, from deep-seated racialized attitudes to other prejudices that shape and drive the way people think and behave. In other words, if anxiety – as an innate and ingrained mood – constitutes being and shapes thinking and behaviour, then, the risk-fear paradox ceases to exist; in fact, it never existed in the first place because what might not be explicable empirically – and, thus be statistically tenable – can be “explained” by a priori means. Thus, for example, A, who is among the least likely to be a victim of crime and yet has a high rate of fear, ought not to be labelled as irrational because A does not have an irrational sense of fear (even if, for example, B, C and D are also least likely to be victimized and by contrast have very low levels of fear). In other words, because A’s fear may not be tied to crime rates or disorder or even the ways others think and behave, but rather to particularized innate states of mind (recall that Heidegger sees the revelatory potential in anxiety in its individualized form) that themselves are products of socially produced contingencies (e.g. place),

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102 Cf Walklate, supra note 20 at 404; Fanghanel, supra note 8 at 62; McGowan, supra note 8 at 193; Robinson & Gadd, supra note 18.
the way A thinks and acts is, in fact, rational (just as the ways B, C and D do are). Thus, if anxiety is largely inexplicable, yet holds the key to understanding fear, then, the risk-fear paradox ceases to exist as does the supposed irrationality of beings who do not view “objective data” in a particular manner. This is what Mark Stafford and Omer Galle noted some three decades ago about the reductive tendencies in fear of crime research: “fear of crime should not be viewed cavalierly as irrational or unjustified” because “it would be premature at best to conclude that fear is irrational, for we know little about how objective risks are translated into fear.”

What is claimed here is that the translation of objective data into a personalized form is largely irrelevant because a more powerful and deep-seated drive shapes the being of beings.

Thus, and returning to A, A might be highly fearful for a plethora of reasons that A him/herself might not be able to explicate and these could range from various neuroses to prejudice to racism among others – for example, in relation to hanging on to something that is still nothing and yet something, as Heidegger claims. None of these are irrational because they are extant within, as a matter of being, which means that to claim that they are irrational is to claim that the very being of A itself is nullified. The literature contains ample examples that could be read in this way, but perhaps a poignant one is provided by Robinson and Gadd who discuss the explanation provided by a woman who was physically and sexually abused by her own parents during her childhood, but who nevertheless continues to view them as the most important thing in her life. What might seem irrational to most should not be viewed as such because to reduce such a way of thinking and being to irrationality is to do not only profound harm to this woman, but to all women who have suffered abuse (along with numerous other groups who have endured myriad struggles). The paradoxes of anxiety – which this woman appears to “wear” daily – it is suggested here, help shed light on the rationality of what is often problematically read as irrational. What Heidegger claims is that a mood such as anxiety is far from problematic but, rather, is part and parcel of life. What he does well – and what fear of crime research and the social sciences

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103 Stafford & Galle, supra note 21 at 182.
104 Robinson & Gadd, supra note 18 at 196.
105 See Prashan Ranasinghe, "Undoing’ Gender and the Production of Insecurity and Fear" (2013) 53:5 Brit J Crim 824; Prashan Ranasinghe, “Discourse, Practice and the Production of the Polysemy of Security” (2013) 17:1 Theoretical Criminology 89.
more generally can learn from – is to clearly explicate that such moods do not lend themselves to full explication. The problem, then, is not the admission of the inexplicable nature of something; rather, it is the pretense that even the inexplicable can be explicated that is at issue. This is the problem, in fact, danger, that fear of crime research – and the social sciences generally – has created for itself, and which it must extricate itself from.

IV. CONCLUSION

This article has highlighted important limitations and gaps extant in the fear of crime research and heralded the import of anxiety to understanding and making sense of fear (of crime). The article theoretically engages anxiety by invoking Heidegger. What Heidegger’s insightful analysis of fear and anxiety reveals are the paradoxes of anxiety: anxiety is simultaneously something and yet nothing and, as well, sited somewhere and yet is nowhere. What this means is that while anxiety is revelatory – casting light on the death of life, translated here as the limits of knowledge production – it is also, and still, concealed, so that the site of these very revelations are themselves ambiguous and, thus, inexplicable. These paradoxes, the article claims, are far from problematic, especially because they are essential to explaining the supposed risk-fear paradox that has plagued fear of crime research. The article claims that this paradox – which is, in fact, not a paradox – disappears when the paradoxes of anxiety are brought into a meaningful conversation with fear (of crime); additionally, and equally important, the belief that certain fears are irrational can also be properly placed within intellectual inquiry and, in fact, shown to be rational. Heidegger’s penetrating analysis of fear and anxiety powerfully illustrates the limits of knowledge (production) and this article claims that fear of crime research and the social sciences can benefit from far more modest approaches to its inquiry than its oft seen and lauded scientific voracity that is frequently infused within a positivistic tenor.